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[N]o man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim
of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day.1
INTRODUCTION
Do Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinions in the gay rights cases of
Romer v. Evans,2 Lawrence v. Texas,' United States v. Windsor,' and
Obergefell v. Hodges5 have any impact on the future of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence beyond rights for gays, lesbians, and
transgender persons? We don't know. It is possible these cases will
simply remain siloed in their unique legal and cultural niche, but
viewing them through the lens of 150 years of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence suggests they may signal a shift in due process and equal
protection analysis. This shift could open the doors for challenging
discriminatory laws under a more robust rational basis analysis than
that which is generally employed under the traditional tiered-scrutiny
structure.
On its surface, state laws regarding ownership of dogs may not
immediately come to mind as an ideal test case for the reach of this
shift in Fourteenth Amendment analysis, but it would not be the first
time the United States Supreme Court has considered dog law under the
* Ann L. Schiavone is an Assistant Professor at Duquesne University
School of Law. I would like to thank my Duquesne Law colleagues Profs. Wesley
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1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
2. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
5. No. 14-556 (U.S. June 26, 2015).
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Fourteenth Amendment.6 Breed-specific canine laws provide an
interesting opportunity to build upon past precedent and explore what
protections might exist for dog owners whose property and liberty
interests are infringed upon by such laws. Breed-specific laws are
statutes and ordinances that target certain canine breeds or types,
banning or severely restricting ownership of those breeds in
communities. Under these laws, confiscated animals need not have a
history of aggression or bad behavior.' The constitutionality of these
laws has been challenged in both state and federal courts under due
process and equal protection analysis.8 Generally, courts have glossed
over questions of constitutionality, applying a rubber stamp to the laws
through a rational basis analysis, largely because these laws do not
involve classes or rights given heightened scrutiny under the traditional
tiered approach.9 However, cases like Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and
Obergefell potentially signal a shift away from declaration of new rights
and suspect classes, while applying a stronger rational basis test, at
least in some instances.
A constitutional challenge to breed-specific laws is closely
analogous to successful statutory challenges in the gay rights cases, as
well as United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno"o and City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc." Three general factors arise
in each of these situations: 1) involvement of a general fundamental
right (in the case of dog law, both a property right and potentially a
liberty right could be involved); 2) proof of animus at the heart of the
law; and 3) sociological or empirical data that shows there is no
rational relationship between the goals of the statute and the means u ed
to achieve it. These factors, coupled with a closer reading of the
historical Fourteenth Amendment dog-law case mentioned above,12
suggest breed-specific laws might be ripe for meaningful review.
6. See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
7. See, e.g., Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 820 P.2d
644, 650 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); City of Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings II), 871 N.E.2d
1152, 1155 (Ohio 2007).
8. See, e.g., Starkey v. Twp. of Chester, 628 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (denying preliminary injunction upon determination that breed-specific law would
likely survive challenge on equal protection and due process grounds by meeting the
traditional rational basis test); Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 766-68
(Kan. 1989) (opining that ordinance banning pit bulls was related to a legitimate
governmental purpose and satisfied a rational basis test for purposes of an equal
protection challenge).
9. See cases cited supra note 8.
10. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
11. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
28
2016:27 Unleashing the Fourteenth Amendment
I. DOGS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad
In 1897, within the first few decades of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court took up a case concerning the
intersection of dog law and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,
Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad." Since then, Sentell has
become the singular starting point for almost any constitutional question
in dog law and has been cited to support breed-specific laws.14
However, a more careful reading of the case suggests it should not
support such laws at all.
Sentell arose from a dog owner's action to recover damages from
the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company for the death of a
valuable Newfoundland whom he kept for breeding purposes." The
owner took the dog for a walk while she was pregnant with a litter of
puppies.16 The dog stopped on railroad tracks and was hit and killed by
an electric car.17 The owner sued the railroad for negligence in the
death of the dog.'8 The facts of the case itself were not at issue in the
Supreme Court case.1 9 Instead, the Court had only to pass judgment on
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute used by the railroad as an
affirmative defense.20 The statute required that dogs owned by citizens
be registered with the tax assessor as personal property and a value
assigned to the dog.21 Upon such registration, the owner would confirm
his personal property rights in the dog up to the value assigned by the
owner on the tax rolls.22 Since the dog owner never registered the
Newfoundland, the statute indicated he was not entitled to recovery for
the death of the dog.23 The dog owner then argued that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his property
13. 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
14. See, e.g., Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 820 P.2d
644, 653 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
15. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 700.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 698.
19. Id. at 700.
20. Id. at 698.
21. Id. at 698-99.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 699.
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without due process.24 It is important to note that the statute applied to
all dogs equally.25
Ultimately, the Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the
police power.26 The opinion, however, includes a rich discussion of the
basis of the decision, and such rationale suggests the Court would find
breed-specific laws impossible to fairly apply and, likely, a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court stated that valid
regulations must apply to all dogs equally because "it is practically
impossible by statute to distinguish between the different breeds, or
between the valuable and the worthless."27 According to the Court,
communities, under police power, may apply "reasonable regulation"
to "the whole canine race" and through such regulation communities
will be able to separate the wheat from the chaff.28 Examples of
reasonable regulation noted by the Court included license requirements,
leash laws, and destruction of dogs posing imminent danger.29 While
the opinion supports the validity of regulation of dogs under the police
power of the state,"o it does not suggest hat this power is limitless."
The traditional concept of police power, which supports elimination of
nuisance in conjunction with protection of property rights, pervades this
32opinion. Nothing in this opinion supports rounding up and destroying
a particular breed or type of dog without a history of dangerousness.
Breed-specific laws attempt to do what the Sentell Court called
"practically impossible. "34
Despite Sentell's deference to legislative authority, the Court
acknowledged that the statutes in question were "more than ordinarily
stringent."35 How then would the Sentell Court have viewed statutes
24. Id.
25. See id. at 701.
26. Id. at 706.
27. Id. at 701.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 703-04.
30. Id. at 706.
31. Id. at 705.
32. See id. at 702-06; see also Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The
Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 511 (2000) (noting that the historical notion of police power rested upon the
concept of preventing nuisance).
33. City of Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007).
34. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 701. The Court's instincts were correct on this score;
recent empirical studies show it is largely impossible to visually identify a dog's breed.
See, e.g., Victoria L. Voith et al., Comparison of Visual and DNA Breed Identification
of Dogs and Inter-Observer Reliability, 3 Am. J. Soc. RES. 17 (2013).
35. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 706.
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that more egregiously violate due process and equal protection than the
ones discussed in the case? Sentell stands for the proposition that dogs
are properly regulated under the police power, but it does not support
unreasonable or irrational laws.36 In the years since Sentell was
decided, development of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has
progressed such that courts determine the constitutionality of legislative
acts by analysis of both the means and the ends of such acts via the
rational basis test.7 While the rational basis test has often provided a
rubber stamp to legislative action, recent decades have seen an up-surge
in cases where the Court has invalidated statutes under meaningful
rational basis review. The next section will look at this particular
development in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and consider
why breed-specific laws would be good test of its limits.
B. Meaningful Rational Basis?
Despite opportunities, the Court has not acknowledged a new
suspect or quasi-suspect class in nearly forty years.38 The demise of the
practice of adding new groups and rights to tiered scrutiny coincided
with the rise of what has been called "rational basis with bite," the
application of rational basis as a meaningful ends-means analysis rather
than a rubber stamp on legislative action.39 This analysis has not been
applied to every rational basis case, but the Court has tended to use it
when some form of animus against a group that is not part of a suspect
class or quasi-suspect class is at the heart of a law and where
sociological evidence is present to show there is no rational connection
between the statute and the legislative goals.
Meaningful rational basis analysis first became a reality in 1973 in
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, followed a decade
later by City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. In these
cases, the Court struck down laws under equal protection that harmed
minority groups that did not qualify as suspect or quasi-suspect classes,
low-income individuals and the developmentally disabled, respectively.
In both cases, the Court noted that laws built on a "desire to harm a
36. See id. at 704-06.
37. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (articulating
the rational basis test for the first time).
38. Emily K. Baxter, Rationalizing Away Political Powerlessness: Equal
Protection Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 Mo. L. REV. 891, 894
(2007).
39. Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions
Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 333 (2013).
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politically unpopular group" cannot pass equal protection review.40 in
Cleburne particularly, the Court stressed that unsubstantiated fears and
negative attitudes of neighbors concerning the developmentally disabled
were an insufficient basis upon which to draw a classification.41
For decades scholars debated the meaning of Cleburne and Moreno
and whether they signaled a larger shift in Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence or were merely one-off, results-based opinions.42 The
string of cases concerning gay rights-beginning with Romer v. Evans
in 1996 and followed by Lawrence v. Texas in 2003; United States v.
Windsor in 2013; and, most recently, Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015-
provides more evidence that we are seeing a shift in due process and
equal protection jurisprudence. The broader application of this shift,
however, remains in question.
In the 1996 opinion in Romer v. Evans, Justice Anthony Kennedy
drew upon Moreno to strike down a Colorado constitutional
amendment, passed by referendum, that prohibited local governments
from passing ordinances protecting persons from discrimination based
on sexual orientation.4 3 Kennedy employed a rational basis analysis and
found the amendment "so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that [it] seems inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it
affects." 44
Seven years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a
Texas law criminalizing sexual conduct by two persons of the same
gender.45 Again, Kennedy wrote for the Court, upholding an
individual's "liberty" interest in making decisions related to personal
choices regarding marriage, family, procreation, and intimate
conduct.46 While this opinion seems to extend the fundamental right of
privacy to private consensual sexual relations regardless of gender or
orientation, it is interesting to note that Kennedy did not employ strict
scrutiny language; rather, toward the end of the opinion, he wrote,
"The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."47 This
language is that of the rational basis test.
40. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), quoted in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
41. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
42. See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the
Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591, 615 (2000).
43. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996).
44. Id. at 632.
45. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003).
46. Id. at 567, 574.
47. Id. at 578.
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Ten years after the Court's decision in Lawrence, Kennedy again
authored the Court's opinion in United States v. Windsor, which struck
down the Defense of Marriage Act, finding that it "violate[d] basic due
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal
Government."48 The Court, again, declined an opportunity to declare
gays and lesbians members of a quasi-suspect class49 and, instead,
bolstered the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment by
invoking Fourteenth Amendment rational basis cases like Romer."o
Finally, in 2015, the Court struck down state laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, extending the fundamental
right to marriage to same-sex couples. Calling upon concepts of
"liberty" and "equality," Kennedy conflated the language of due
process and equal protection analysis.52 While the opinion does not
specifically apply a rational basis analysis, it eschews development of
the law by "formula" and avoids many of the trappings of traditional
tiered-scrutiny analysis, focusing instead on the lofty goals of "liberty"
and "equality."
Whether any of these opinions provide direct precedential value
outside of the realm of gay rights is yet unknown. But, these cases do
signal that Moreno and Cleburne were not singular opinions, and
perhaps they also signify dissatisfaction with tiered scrutiny that runs
deeper than generally believed. If the Court continues to avoid finding
new fundamental rights and new suspect classes, it seems probable that
the meaningful rational basis review of Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and
Windsor will become the new normal.
II. BREED-SPECIFIC LAWS VIOLATE LIBERTY & EQUALITY
The equal protection cases of Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and
Windsor all share three major similarities: 1) implication of general
fundamental rights; 2) discrimination based upon animus against a
particular disfavored group; and 3) sociological or other empirical data
that refutes a rational connection between the ends and means.5 A case
48. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
49. The Second Circuit did rest its decision on declaring gays and lesbians a
quasi-suspect class and applying heightened scrutiny analysis. Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
50. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
51. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 21-23 (U.S. June 26,
2015).
52. Id. at 17-23.
53. Id. at 10.
54. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Sociological Ass'n in Support
of Respondent Kristin M. Perry & Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Hollingsworth v.
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challenging breed-specific laws also has potential to evidence all three
of these factors.
First, dog owners have constitutionally protected property rights in
their dogs." As noted above, the Court in Sentell admits to a property
right, as do a majority of federal circuit courts, specifically declaring
that owners have a property right in their dogs protected by the Fourth
Amendment.5 6 In addition, there may also be a "liberty" interest
argument, at least insofar as some of these laws allow for the invasion
of privacy of the owner's home to investigate and confiscate dogs with
51no history of dangerousness.
Second, animus is at the root of breed-specific laws in many ways.
Breed-specific laws do seem to arise from irrational fears and
prejudices against the human owners, as much as the dogs themselves.
The perception of the owners of many banned breeds, particularly pit
bulls, is one of "counterculture" and the "other" in society.5' Breed
bans tend to be influenced by the perception that he typical owner is
morally corrupt.59 For example, media articles about breed-specific
laws have stressed the connection between pit bulls and "members of
street gangs and drug pushers, "60 "lowlifes, 61  and "inner-city
teenagers."62
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 4737188 (including significant
reference to sociological evidence supporting advocates of gay marriage).
55. See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 705 (1897).
56. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of West Branch, 454 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2006)
(holding that shooting a dog within an enclosed fence on private property constitutes a
Fourth Amendment taking); Altman v. City of Highpoint, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003)
(ruling that dogs are personal effects protected by the Fourth Amendment and that their
destruction by animal control officers is a seizure); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001) (opining that shooting and killing a pet dog is an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment when the dog shows no signs of aggression and
its owner is in close proximity to the dog).
57. See City of Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings I), No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL
513946, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007).
58. See, e.g., Jaclyn E. Barnes et al., Ownership of High-Risk ("Vicious")
Dogs as a Marker for Deviant Behaviors, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1616 (2006).
The authors of this study linked socially deviant and criminal behavior with owning a
so-called high-risk dog. Id. "High-risk dog" was defined by the authors "according to
Section 955.11 of the Ohio Revised Code for 'vicious dog,"' the same statute that was
at issue in Tellings l and Tellings II, which, at the time, categorically included pit bulls.
Id. at 1618-19.
59. See id.
60. David Brand et al., "Time Bombs on Legs": Violence-Prone Owners Are
Turning Pit Bulls into Killers, TIME, July 27, 1987, at 60.
61. Michelle Green, An Instinct for the Kill, PEOPLE (July 6, 1987),
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/O,,20096665,00.html.
62. Id.
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While this is general evidence of animus, direct evidence also
arises that breed-specific laws are racially or culturally motivated. In
City of Toledo v. Tellings (Tellings 1),63 the Ohio Court of Appeals
noted that the trial court, which upheld a pit-bull ban, found that "the
pit bull has been used extensively for dog fighting and by 'criminal
elements of the population, such as drug dealers, dog fighters, and
urban gang members."'64 Even more compelling is legislative history
that indicates such animus underlies these laws. For example, when the
city council of Aurora, Colorado was debating implementation of its
pit-bull ban, a councilwoman said that she supported a pit-bull ban
"because she did not want 'those people' moving to Aurora." 65 These
are just a few examples of the types of animus underlying
breed-specific laws.
Finally, there is a plethora of social science and empirical data to
support the fact that breed-specific laws do not reduce dog bites or
prevent severe or fatal dog attacks.66 Courts employing a meaningful
rational basis review would find bite statistics analyses, surveys,
epidemiological studies, and brain chemistry research all tending to
undermine breed-specific laws as a reasonable or effective policy. 67
Additionally, and most importantly, current research also shows that
humans cannot accurately identify canine breeds by sight.68 This
research calls into question both the reasonableness of the observations
that led to the laws and the clear inability of the laws to ever be fairly
or rationally enforced.69 It cuts the connection between the laws and the
63. No. L-04-1224, 2006 WL 513946 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 871
N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio 2007).
64. Id. at *6.
65. Appellant's Opening Brief at 26, Vianzon v. City of Aurora, No. 09-1434
(10th Cir. May 12, 2010), 2009 WL 5069092.
66. See, e.g., Belin Rosado et al., Spanish Dangerous Animals Act: Effect on
the Epidemiology of Dog Bites, 2 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 166 (2007) (finding that
Spanish legislation "targeting so-called 'dangerous [dog] breeds"' had "little impact on
the epidemiology of dog bites").
67. See, e.g., Marta Amat et al., Differences in Serotonin Serum
Concentration Between Aggressive English Cocker Spaniels and Aggressive Dogs of
Other Breeds, 8 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 19 (2013); Jessica M.R. Cornelissen & Hans
Hopster, Dog Bites in The Netherlands: A Study of Victims, Injuries, Circumstances
and Aggressors to Support Evaluation of Breed Specific Legislation, 186 VETERINARY J.
292 (2010); Gary J. Patronek et al., Co-occurrence of Potentially Preventable Factors
in 256 Dog Bite-Related Fatalities in the United States (2000-2009), 243 J. AM.
VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1726 (2013); J. Vige et al., Association of Dopamine- and
Serotonin-Related Genes with Canine Aggression, 9 GENES BRAIN & BEHAV. 372
(2010).
68. Voith et al., supra note 34.
69. Ann L. Schiavone, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Regulating Fear, Not
Risk, 22 ANIMAL L. (forthcoming 2016).
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legislative goal, showing breed-specific laws are not rationally related
to legitimate governmental ends.
CONCLUSION
Based on the recent gay rights cases, Fourteenth Amendment
analysis appears to be in the midst of a shift away from formulaic tiers
and toward meaningful rational basis review. As unlikely as it may first
appear, breed-specific dog laws could be an ideal test to determine if
this change will extend beyond the rights of gays, lesbians, and
transgendered persons to others whose "liberty" and "equality"
interests are clearly infringed upon by laws not rationally related to
their stated purpose.
